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NOTES
THE NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS:
THE SCOPE OF DUTY AND FORESEEABILITY OF
INJURY
I. INTRODUCTION
Bystander recovery for the negligent infliction of mental
distress traditionally has been denied to the plaintiff who fears for
the safety of another.' In 1968 California broke cleanly from the
majority rule in Dillon v. Legg,2 by compensating the foreseeable
mental injuries of a plaintiff who witnessed her child being struck
by a carelessly driven automobile. Less than one year later in Tobin
v. Grossman,3 New York refused to adopt the Dillon rule, holding
that a plaintiff who witnesses a tortfeasor collide with her child may
recover damages for the negligent infliction of mental distress only
if the plaintiff is in a position to fear for her own bodily safety.4 The
nation was thus divided in a Palsgrafian dispute: New York,
following the Cardozo theory of limited duty, 5  refused to
compensate the bystander to the accident who suffered mental
anguish but was outside the zone of physical danger, 6 while
1. See Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688, 697-98 (E.D. Ark. 1959)
(recovery denied to plaintiff who witnessed her father being crushed by defendant's vehicle);
Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N. D . 1972) (recovery denied to mother who
witnessed hospital employee drop baby); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603 .... 258 N.W. 497,
501 (1935) (recovery denied to husband who witnessed wife die from shock after viewing her
daughter being struck by automobile).
2. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See generally Note. Nelitgent Infliction of
Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Le gi in California and Other States, 25 HASTINCS L.J. 1248 (1974).
3.24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
4. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 611, 249 N.E.2d 419, 419-20, 301 N.Y.S 2d 554, 555
(1969).
5. SeePalsgrafv. LongIsland R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99(1928).
6. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
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California, adhering to the Andrews theory, 7 held the negligent
actor accountable for foreseeable mental injury sustained by third
parties to the tort. 8 The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in
Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital, 9 examined the Dillon- Tobin dichotomy
and reasoned that damages for mental distress are recoverable only
if the plaintiff bystander is within the physical zone of danger. 10
This Note will review the public policy considerations
underlying the Dillon foreseeability test and the Tobin zone of
danger rule, examine the North Dakota case of Whetham v. Bismarck
Hospital'1 in light of these policy reasons, and discuss cases from
other jurisdictions which have adopted the Dillon policy of increased
liability but have, nonetheless, modified the Dillon foreseeability
test. A discussion of recent California decisions, which expressly
defined the limits of foreseeable mental distress under Dillon, will
follow.
This Note will also analyze limited situations in which a
bystander theory of recovery for the negligent infliction of mental
distress is arguably inapplicable to the facts presented. Finally, it
will suggest a theory of recovery to be applied in situations in which
the Tobin zone of danger test inequitably restricts claims for the
negligent infliction of mental distress. This theory incorporates
traditional tort principles without ignoring the desire for
manageable constraints on liability.
II. THE HISTORICAL TORT
A. THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS
Beginning in 1348 in the case of I de S et ux v. S, 12 in which a
tavern keeper's wife successfully eluded the hatchet of an irate
customer, courts have struggled to recognize mental -tranquility as
an interest worthy of legal protection. Historically, mental anguish
was regarded as being too intangible to merit monetary
compensation and too remote to be a foreseeable consequence of
the defendant's negligent conduct.13 Because of the seemingly
7. See Paisgral v. long Island R.R.. 248 N.Y. 339. 342, 162 N.1'. 90. 101 (Ajidh'%s, J.,
disscn ing).
8. Se Dilon v. legg, 68 Cal. 2(1 728,441 P.2d 912,69 Cal. Rpir. 72(1968).
9. 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972). Se 49 N.D. I. R~v. 741 (1973).
10. Whethani v. Bismarck Hlosp., 197 N.W.2d 678,684 (N.I). 1972).
11. Id.
12. 22 Edw. Ill, f. 99, pl. 60(1348).
13. See, e.g., W . PROSSER, I,,AW OF- TORTS t 12, ait 50. (4tlh cd. 1971) Iherin;icil r ciied as




speculative nature of mental distress, the first courts to consider this
issue agreed unanimously that fright could not be the basis of an
action. 14 These courts also generally agreed, however, that when
the plaintiff alleged an independent tort, such as assault, battery, or
false imprisonment, mental anguish could be considered in the
computation of damages. 15 Such redress was deemed "parasitic"
upon the intrusion of a legally protected interest. 16
Gradually, "parasitic" damages evolved into an independent
cause of action known as the intentional infliction of mental
distress 7 or, for want of a better term, the tort of "outrage. ,,18 The
test for the existence of "outrage" is an objective one. 19 By
definition, the intrusion must be extreme and outrageous.20 It must
be calculated to cause severe emotional distress in a person of
ordinary sensibilities, 2' and the distress must in fact exist. Once the
conduct is labeled "outrageous," the prevailing view is that
physical manifestations are not required to prove the existence of
mental distress. The important element seems to be that since the
act is intentional, the actor should anticipate anguish as a
consequence.
B. THE NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS
The negligent infliction of mental distress was originally
compensable in only a narrowly defined class of cases. In these
14. See, e.g., Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (190)
(mental distress too subtle to be capable of measurement); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107,
•45 N.E. 354 (1896) (mental distress too metaphysical); 37 FORDHAt L. REx,. 429 (1969) (psychic
injuries not compensated by earlier courts).
15. E.g., Holdorfv. Holdorf. 185 Iowa 838, 169 N.W. 737 (1918) (mental anguish compensable
when coupled with assault); Fischer v. Rumler, 239 Mich. 224, 214 N.W. 310 (1927) (damages for
mental distress permitted with claim of false imprisonment); Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W.
527 (1884) (damages for mental distress recoverable with damages for battery).
16. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 13, § 54 at 50. See also Beaulieu v. Great Northern Ry., 103
Minn. 47. 114 N.W. 353 (1907).
17. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 54 at 330.
18. Id. § 12 at 52 n.47. Commenting on the evolution of actionable claims for the negligent
tnfliction of mental distress, one author has stated the following:
The treatment of any element of damages as a parasitic factor belongs essentially
to a transitory state of legal evolution. A factor which is today recognized as parasite
will, forsooth, tomorrow, be recognized as an independent basis of liabilitv. It is
merely a question of social, economic and industrial needs as those needs are reflected
in ttie organic law.
Id. (citing I STREET, FotuNDATIONS OF LEGAl. LIABIItITY 460, 470 (1906)).
19. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958) (the determination of
whether words or conduct are actionable is made from an objective rather than sublective standard).
20. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952)
(threatening to put plaintiff out of business is extreme and outrageous conduct): Moore v. Savage,
359 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (creditors continued harrassment deemed extreme and
outrageous).
21. Cf Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920) (defendant's knowledge ofplaintiff's
special sensitivities made marginally offensive conduct extreme and outrageous).
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cases, traditional tort concepts of foreseeability and proximate
cause were abandoned in favor of the "impact" rule.2 2 This
mechanical rule dictated that emotional distress resulting from the
defendant's negligent act and unaccompanied by physical injury
was not compensable absent a contemporaneous physical impact
upon the plaintiff. 23
The departure from traditional tort concepts was based
primarily on three policy considerations. First, the early courts
reasoned that a rule granting recovery without physical impact
provided no criteria for separating the legitimate claims from the
fraudulent. 24 Impact, it was thought, would guarantee that the
plaintiff's mental distress was real. 2 Courts have since abandoned
this reasoning as *being unpersuasive, recognizing that the
determination of fraud rests within the province of jury and
judge. 26 They alone have the duty "to distinguish the frivolous
from the substantial and the fraudulent from the
meritorious . ''27
A second reason for denying recovery absent a finding of
impact was that courts would be subject to an avalanche of
litigation. 28 This rationale has influenced few courts because the
very purpose of the forum's cxistence is to redress legal wrongs. 29
Denying to a plaintiff who witnesses another's injury the claim of
mental distress solely on the basis of administrative convenience is
reasoning that most courts, including the New York Court of
22. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (recovery denied
for negligently inflicted mental distress absent physical impact).
23. Id. at 286, 47 N.E. at 89.
24. See, e.g., Braun v. Craven, 175 Il1. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898) (dangerous use might be made of
a claim of mental distress); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (injury
complained of could be easily feigned); Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85
N.E. 499 (1908) (compensation would open door to unjust claims).
25. E.g., Mitchell v. Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (without impact,
measure of damages is pure speculation).
26. Cf Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975) (fraudulent claim rationale
abandoned); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (that some claims may be
spurious should not compel the law to deny claims of merit).
27. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 381, 282 A.2d 351, 356 (1971). See also Note, Ne.'ligent Infliction
fMental Distress.- Reaction to Dillon v. Le in California and Other States, 25 HASTINGS L..1. 1248, 1249
(1974).
28. E..., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. at 286, 47 N. E. at 89 (1897) (administrative
convenience requires continuation of the impact rule).
29. See, e.g., Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A Mew Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874
(1939). Addressing the courts' duty to afford plaintiffs the opportunity to litigate their claims,
Prosser stated the following:
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense
of a "flood of litigation"; and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of





Appeals, have regarded as indefensible. 30
The third reason given for the denial of recovery was that
mental distress was considered too speculative when the tortfeasor's
act was merely careless. 31 Unlike the tort of "outrage," in which
the defendant's deplorable conduct is calculated to cause mental
anguish, mere negligence failed to provide the desired causal
connection between the fright perceived and the injury sustained. 32
Physical impact, it was thought, would thus provide the nexus
between the negligent act and the psychic injury. 33 This rule was
stretched, however, and impact was found in minor contacts wholly
unrelated to the mental anguish experienced by the plaintiff. As a
result, the causal connection between impact and injury was not
guaranteed. 34 Furthermore, advances in medicine deflated the logic
underlying the impact rule. Medical knowledge of psychic and
nervous disorders has reduced markedly the difficulty of finding a
causal relationship between fright and injury. 35
The plaintiff who suffers anguish merely by witnessing injury
to another will surely be denied recovery in a jurisdiction
employing the "impact" rule. 36 Because of advancements in
medical science and the arbitrary application of the rule, however,
the majority of jurisdictions have relegated the impact test to the
legal museum. 37 Currently, the prevailing position is that the
plaintiff bystander who witnesses a tort committed upon another
may recover damages for the negligent infliction of mental distress
only if the plaintiff is within the physical zone of danger. 38 As
30. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). The court
in Tobin stated that "filt suffices that ifa cognizable wrong has been committed that there must be a
remedy, whatever the burden of the courts." Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. See
also Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander. The Transcontinental Dispute Between New York and California,
51 ST..JoHrq's L. REV. 1, 13 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Simons, Psychic Injury[.
31. E.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (without impact,
measure ofdamages is pure speculation).
32. See Simons, Psychic Injury, supra note 30, at 13.
33. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 54 at 331 ("impact" affords guarantee that distress is genuine).
34. See, e.g., Cameron v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 182 Mass. 310, 65 N.E. 385 (1902)
(impact found when a negligent blast frightened plaintiff, causing her to fall out of her rocking chair);
Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 155, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (impact found when smoke passed through
the nostrils of the claimant); Kasey v. Suurban Gas Heat ofKennewick, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 468, 374
P.2d 549 (1962) (shock wave from explosion deemed impact). See also 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 212, 214-
15 (1979) (cases cited where "impact" was unrelated to distress suffered).
35. See, e.g., Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (courts
can rely on medical proof to sift through fraudulent claims); Niederman v. Brodsky 436 Pa. 401, 261
A.2d 84 (1970) (inappropriate to ignore advances medical science has made in past eighty years).
36. See, re. , Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688, 697 (E.D. Ark. 1959)
(plaitntiff's suffering not due to "impact" but rather a psychosomatic injury due to witnessing her
father being (-rushed by defendant's vehicle).
37. Se,, e.. , Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (impact
rule rejected). Battalla was quickly followed by the large majority of jurisdictions. See PROSSER, supra
note 13, § 54 at 332.
38. See, e.g., Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972) (plaintiff mother
who witnessed her baby fall from nurse's arms denied recovery because plaintiffwas not within zone
of physical danger); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969)
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exemplified in Tobin v. Grossman, 9 this rule allows recovery if the
plaintiff is within the zone of physical risk caused by the
defendant's negligence and fears for potential physical impact upon
his person. 40 Thus, if the plaintiff is not in danger of imminent
physical contact, any allegation that the plaintiff feared for the
safety of another would fail upon defendant's motion for
dismissal. 4 '
The plaintiff bystander, who suffers mental anguish by
witnessing harm to another, often is not within the zone of physical
danger.42 Typically, the scene involves a mother who, while inside
the house, observes the striking of her child in the street by a
tortfeasor behind the wheel.43 Although the mother is justifiably
distressed, recovery for her mental anguish is denied because she
was not in a position to fear for her own bodily safety.44 Such
seemingly unjust results have prompted courts to scrutinize the
prudence of limiting a defendant's duty to an arbitrarily drawn
area of physical proximity.
California was the first jurisdiction to abandon the zone of
danger test. In Dillon v. Legg45 a negligent motorist collided with
Erin Dillon, causing her witnessing mother and sister nervous
shock and mental distress.4 6 Although the mother and sister were
within a few yards of each other, the facts revealed that only the
sister was positioned in the zone of physical danger.4 7 Under then-
existing California law, the defendant owed no duty to one outside
the zone of danger.4 8 The trial court, basing its decision strictly on
precedent, denied Mrs. Dillon's claim for relief.4 9
(recov ery denied to plaintitf who witnessed her child being struck by automobile because plaintiff was
[lt in danger of physical harm).
39. 24 N. Y.2d 609, 249 N. F. 2d 419, 301 N.Y. S. 2d 554 (1969).
40. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (2). (3). Comment I provides that the
defendant is liable to the plaintiff "[where the defendant's negligent conduct threatens bodily harm
to the plaintiff through direct impact upon his person, or in some other way than through emotional
disturbance, and the bodily harm is brought about instead by the plaintill's emotional disturbance at
the peril of harm of a third person." Id. comment f, at 459.
41. Seesupra note 38.
42. See, e.., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912. 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (mother
observed child being struck by car while mother was outside zone of danger): Waube v. Warringtun,
216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497 (1935) (plaintifl's wife, while in frail state of health, observed car collide
with daughter. Plaintiff ldenied recovery fir witnessing wile's death because he was not in danger of
physical harm).
43. See, e.., Sinn v. Burd. 486 Pa. 146. 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (fron window of house mother
observed car collide with her child).
44. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609. 611. 249 N.E.2d 4 19, 419-20. 301 N.Y.S.2d 554,
555 ( 1969).
45. 68 Cal. 2d 728. 441 P.2d 912.69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
46. Id. at 731-32, 441 P.2d at 914-15, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
47. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
48. Before Dillon, California restricted bystander recovery by the zone of danger test. Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 306, 379 P.2d 513, 519, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 39 (1963),
overruled, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
49. 68 Cal. 2d at 732, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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The Supreme Court of California, however, was unwilling to
sanction such a result merely "because of a happenstance that the
sister was some few yards closer to the accident" than the mother. 50
In the court's view, compensating the sister for mental distress
while denying relief to the mother demonstrated the arbitrary and
unjust results promulgated by the zone of danger rule. 51
Furthermore, the Dillon court found that the zone of danger test
seemed particularly unsupportable because California previously
had abandoned the impact rule. 2 The court noted that while
eliminating the requirement of impact, the zone of danger test still
mandated fear of potential impact. Therefore, in the Dillon court's
view, the zone of danger test was based on a fact now deemed
irrelevant. 53
After considering the fallacies inherent in the zone of danger
test, the Dillon court adopted a far-reaching change in California
tort law. The court permitted Mrs. Dillon's claim for emotional
trauma, holding that the tortfeasor was liable for the negligent
infliction of mental distress when the bystander-witness was outside
the zone of danger, the ensuing distress was reasonably foreseeable,
and it was manifested by physical symptoms. 54
The Dillon court thus expanded duty from the zone of physical
danger to the zone of foreseeable risk.5 5 Unlike the zone of danger
rule, which limits liability to an area of physical proximity, the zone
of risk test limits liability by the traditional tort concept of
foreseeability.5 6  If, under the circumstances, a bystander's
emotional distress is reasonably foreseeable, the bystander is
included in the zone of risk. 57 Accordingly, a duty to refrain from
50. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. Mrs. Dillon was positioned in the front
yard while the victim's sister was standing on the curb, arguably within the zone of danger. Id.
51. Id.
52. Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1939).
53. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. Viewing the zone of danger rule as
illogical as the impact rule, the Supreme Court of California stated the following:
[T]o rest upon the zone-of-danger rule when we have rejected the impact rule becomes
even less defensible. We have, indeed, held that impact is not necessary for recovery.
The zone-of-danger concept must, then, inevitably collapse because the only reason
for the requirement of presence in that zone lies in the fact that one within it will fear
the danger of impact.
Id. (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. California subsequently abandoned the
Dillon requirement of physical symptoms for recovery of damages for mental distress. In Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980), the Supreme
Court of California reasoned that the requirement of physical symptoms encourged extravagent
pleading. Id. at -, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. Moreover, the Molien court viewed
physical manifestations as an arbitrary classification scheme. Id.
55. 68 Cal. 2d at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
56. Id.
57. Id. See Simons, Psychic Injury, supra note 30, at 1, 5.
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the distress-causing activity is ascribed to the defendant.58
The compelling facts of Dillon provided an untroubled answer
to the issue of the foreseeability of the bystander's mental distress.
In the court's view, a negligent driver who causes the death of a
child may reasonably expect that the mother will be nearby.5 9
Further, the Dillon court reasoned that the tortfeasor should expect
the mother's emotional trauma as a consequence of his negligent
conduct. 60 The Dillon court, however, recognized that future cases
might involve facts that do not call for the plaintiffs
remuneration. 61 The court therefore offered three guidelines to
determine whether a bystander's emotional distress was reasonably
foreseeable:
(1) Whether the plaintiff was located near the scene
of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance
away from it;
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct
emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as
contrasted with learning of the accident from others after
its occurrence; [and]
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely
related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship
or the presence of only a distant relationship. 62
Before the wake of Dillon had settled, the Court of Appeals of
New York had occasion to wrestle with the issue of bystander
recovery. In Tobin v. Grossman63 the plaintiff alleged mental pain
and suffering as a result of witnessing a negligent motorist collide
58. 68 Cal. 2d at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. R ptr. at 80.
59. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. Seeoalso PROSSER, supra note 13, § 54 at 334.
60. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. See also PROSSER, supra note 13, § 54
at 334. "[Wlhen a child is endangered, it is not beyond contemplation that its mother will be
somewhere in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock. " Id. (footnote omitted).
61. 68 Cal. 2d at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79. The Dillon court stated that "Jiln
order to limit the otherwise potential infinite liability which would follow every negligent act, the law
of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others which to the deflendant at the time were
reasonably foreseeable." Id.
62. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The Dillon court also stated that the
aforementioned guidelines must be applied on an adhoc basis:
Such reasonable foreseeability does not turn on whether the particular defendant as an
individual would have in actuality foreseen the exact accident and loss; it
contemplates that courts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will
decide what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have
foreseen. The courts thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding tle remote and
unexpected.
Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
63. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
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with her infant daughter. 64 The Tobin court refused to adopt the
Dillon rule and held that there was no cause of action for emotional
distress solely as a result of witnessing harm to another.
65
The Tobin court reasoned that the Dillon foreseeability test
would not confine liability within tolerable limits. In the court's
view, once the test was employed its logic could not reasonably be
contained. 66 Liability could extend beyond a witnessing mother to a
distant relative who learned of the mishap by phone. 67 Moreover,
the court declared that there were no new technological, economic,
or social developments to warrant an expansion of duty.68 In the
Tobin court's view, extending recovery to those outside the zone of
danger would place an undue burden on the defendant driver in the
form of costly insurance premiums. 69 The Tobin court, therefore,
reasoned that as a matter of public policy a "dollar-and-cents"
constraint should be placed on liability. 70
The diametrically opposed decisions of Dillon and Tobin are the
modern progeny of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad. 7, Revealed in its
simplest form, the bystander dispute revolves around the issue of
"duty." ' 72 In Tobin the New York Court of Appeals proclaimed
that a tortfeasor's duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of
mental distress is confined to the physical area where the bystander
is subject to potential bodily harm.73 In contrast, the Supreme
Court of California in Dillon declared that a negligent actor owes a
duty to bystanders whose mental trauma is reasonably foreseeable
to the ordinary person under similar circumstances. 74 But "duty,"
"proximate cause," and "foreseeability" are mere legal
conclusions. They are the end products of the sum of policy
64. Id. at 611-12, 617, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 554-56. 560. The facts in
Tobin indicate that, unlike Dillon, the plaintiff mother did not actually witness the accident. She did,
rather, exit the house and witness only the aftermath of the mishap. Id. at 612, 249 N.E.2d at 420,
301 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
65. Id. at 611,249 N.E.2d at 419-20,301 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
66. Id. at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
67. Id. The Tobin court stated that "filf foreseeability be the sole test, then once liability is
extended the logic of the principle would not and could not remain confined. It would extend to older
children, fathers, grandparents, relatives, or others in loco parentis, and even to sensitive caretakers, or
even any other affected bystanders." Id.
68. Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
69. Id. at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559-60. The court explained that
"Iclonstantly advancing insurance costs can become an undue burden as well, and the aggregate
recoveries in a single accident of this kind are not likely to stay within ordinary, let alone, compulsory
insurance liability limits." Id.
70. Id.
71. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
72. See, e.,., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 738, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (tortfeasor's
duty extended to those whose mental suffering is reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances).
Contra, Tobin v. Grossman. 24 N.Y.2d 609. 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969) (social policy
does not warrant an expansion oftortfeasor's duty).
73. 24 N.Y.2d at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
74. 68 Cal. 2d at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
585
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considerations which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled
to protection.7 5 A determination of duty involves, therefore, a
balancing between policy which favors the plaintiff's recovery and
policy which favors limiting the defendant's liability. 7 6
In Dillon the Supreme Court of California concluded that by
compensating only foreseeable mental distress, the defendant's
liability would be adequately limited.77 With the argument of
undue liability purportedly deflated, the scales of policy tipped in
favor of protecting mental tranquility. In Tobin the court declared
that the Dillon foreseeability test could not do what it purported to
do, i.e., reasonably circumscribe liability. 78 Further, the Tobin
court noted that the public's pecuniary interest demanded
reasonable constraints on liability. 79 Balancing the policy of limited
liability against an arguably unworkable "foreseeability" test, the
Court of Appeals of New York concluded that limited liability
would prevail. 8 0
Traditionally, the law of torts has adhered to the classic
statement of Cardozo that "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed." 8 In Dillon the tortfeasor was held
accountable for the foreseeable mental distress suffered by the third
party bystander. 82 In Tobin the tortfeasor owed a duty to refrain
from the negligent infliction of mental distress to only those
positioned in the physical zone of danger. 83 Thus, by disagreeing
on the extent of a tortfeasor's duty, the decisions in Dillon and Tobin
lead to an incongruous result: the reasonable person perceives a
lesser degree of risk of inflicting mental injury upon a bystander in
Albany than in Sacramento. Because of this dichotomy regarding
"duty," other jurisdictions have found no well-delineated rule of
law to apply when they have been presented with bystander claims
for damages from the negligent infliction of mental distress.
III. NORTH DAKOTA EXAMINES THE BYSTANDER
ISSUE
In Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital84 the defendant hospital's
75. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 53 at 325-26.
76. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (the determination of the
extent of a tortfeasor's duty is achieved by weighing the policy considerations that favor plaintiff's
recovery against those that favor limiting defendant's liability).
77. 68 Cal. 2d at 741,441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
78. 24 N.Y.2d at 611-12,617,249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 554-56, 560.
79. Id. at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
80. Id. at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
81. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 340, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
82. 68 Cal. 2d at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
83. 24 N.Y.2d at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
84. 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
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employee was transporting a newborn infant to the mother's bed.
In the process, the employee dropped the infant onto the tiled floor,
causing the witnessing mother severe emotional and mental
shock. 85 The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that because the
mother was neither threatened with physical harm nor inside the
zone of danger, the defendant hospital was not liable for the
mother's resulting mental injuries .8 6
After considering the policy arguments presented by both
Dillon and Tobin, the court in Whetham concluded that the restrictive
liability theory of Tobin would be followed as the law in North
Dakota.8 7 The Supreme Court of North Dakota reasoned that, as a
matter of social policy, a system of compensation based on fault
should not impose liability that is disproportionate to the negligent
actor's degree of moral culpability. 8 The court rejected the policy
considerations of the Dillon foreseeability test because "[ilt is
unthinkable that anyone [should] be liable to the end of time for all
the results that follow in endless sequence from his single act. "89
Furthermore, the court in Whetham rejected the mechanics of
the Dillon foreseeability test. Quoting extensively from the
dissenting opinion in Dillon, which stressed the arbitrary and
artificial distinctions that were inherent in the application of the
Dillon foreseeability test,90 the Supreme Court of North Dakota
reasoned that Dillon created a rule of law that extended liability
beyond the tolerable limits required by public policy. 91
Subscribing to the Tobin policy. of limited liability, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota expressly adopted the zone of
danger test to determine the extent of a tortfeasor's liability for the
negligent infliction of mental distress. 92 Therefore, the court
85 Wthethain v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 679 (N.I). 1972).
86. /d. at 684.
87. Id. The court in Whetham also noted that the Restatement (Second) of Torts had adopted the
zone of danger test by limiting recovery for emotional distress to situations in which the negligence of
the actor created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the bystander. Id. at 683-84. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 40, §436(2), (3).
88. 197 N.W.2d at 681 (citing Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal.2d 295, 315, 379
P.2d 513, 524-25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44-45 (1963)).
89. Id. at 680 (citing Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d at 313, 379 P.2d at
524, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 44).
90. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 749-50, 441 P.2d 912, 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 86 (1968)
(Burke, .J., dissenting). Justice Burke reasoned that the Dillon requisites of a close physical distance
between the accident and the plaintiff, a contemporaneous observance of the accident, and a
plaintiff-victim blood relationship, were incapable of practical application. In Justice Burke's view,
the Dillon majority provided no guidance for determining how "close" the relationship between
plaintiff and victim must be in order for the plaintiff to state a cause of action under Dillon. Id.
Addressing the "contemporaneous observation" requirement mandated by Dillon, Justice Burke
declared that, as a practical matter, the shock is not any less real if the mother does not learn of her
child's accident until after the mishap has occurred. Id. Furthermore, Justice Burke dismissed the
Dillon requirement of having the plaintiffbe "near" the accident because, as a practical matter, there
is no "magic in the plaintiffs being actually present." Id.
91. 197 N.W.2d at 683 (citing Anot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1345 (1970)).
92. Id. at 684.
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concluded that Mrs. Whetham could recover damages only if she
feared potential physical impact on her person. 93 Because the
record contained no indication that Mrs. Whetham was positioned
in the zone of physical danger, the judgment of the district court,
which dismissed the claim for damages from mental distress, was
affirmed.91
The court in Whetham was dissuaded by the policy consider-
ations that arguably support an expansion of duty, 95 and by the
artificial application of the Dillon foreseeability test. 96 Other
jurisdictions presented with the issue of bystander recovery for the
negligent infliction of mental distress have not, however, viewed
the Dillon foreseeability test as incapable of providing a reasonable
circumscription on liability.
IV. DILLON'S RECEPTION
The immediate reaction to the Dillon foreseeability test was less
than enthusiastic in the majority of American jurisdictions. Most
courts, relying on the Tobin limited liability doctrine, adhered to
the zone of danger rule. 97 Although the zone of danger test reflects
the prevailing view today, the number of jurisdictions accepting
Dillon is steadily increasing.9" Of the jurisdictions accepting the
Dillon policy of increased liability for the negligent infliction of
mental distress, however, many have rejected or modified the
mechanics of the Dillon foreseeability test.
Hawaii was the first jurisdiction to follow Dillon and increase
the scope of the defendant's liability for inflicting mental anguish
93. Id.
94. Id. at 684-85.
95. Id. at 681-82 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72, 80). Policy considerations supporting an expansion of liability include the maxim that there
should be a remedy for every substantial wrong and that a tortfeasor should be held accountable for
an injury that is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of engaging in careless activity. Id.
96. Id. (citing 68 Cal. 2d 728, -, 441 P.2d 912, 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72. 86 (Burke, J.,
dissenting)).
97. See, e.g., Welsh v. Davis, 307 F. Supp. 416 (D. Mont. 1969) (husband witnessed wife's
injuries in accident): Slovensky v. Birmingham News Co., 358 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1978)
(wife of discharged employee brought action against employer for mental suffering which resulted
from husband's wrongful discharge); Keck v. Jackson, 112 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979) (plaintiff
witnessed car accident in which her mother was killed); Resavage v. Davis, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d
879 (1952) (mother witnessed daughters struck by automobile); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197
N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972) (mother witnessed newborn infant dropped by hospital employee); Shelton
v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., - Tenn. __, 570 S.W.2d 861 (1978) (father learned after the
accident that three-year old daughter was injured); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d
12 (1969) (mother witnessed daughter struck by automobile).
98. See, e.g., lD'Amicol v. Alverez Shipping Co., 31"Conn. Supp. 164. 326 A.2d 129 (Super. Ct.
1973) (mother and lather witnessed death of son in automobile accident): Leong v. Takasaki, 55
Hawaii 398. 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (plaintiff observed grandmother being struck by negligent
tnotorist): Dziokonski v. Babineau, ___ Mass. _ , 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (mother viewed
child's injuries after accident and cied from nervous shock and father suffered heart attack after
learning of daughter's injuries and wife's death): Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647. 207
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upon a bystander to the accident. In Leong v. Takasaki,99 the
plaintiff, who was walking across the road with his grandmother,
observed a negligent motorist strike and kill her.100 In an action
for the negligent infliction of mental distress, the Leong court
rejected the three-prong test utilized by the Dillon court to
determine whether the plaintiff's mental injury was foreseeable to
the tortfeasor. Noting that the Supreme Court of Hawaii previously
had held that there is a duty to refrain from the negligent infliction
of mental distress, 1' 1 the Leong court reasoned that denying
recovery on the basis of the Dillon requisites of a close physical
distance between the plaintiff and the accident, a contemporaneous
observance of the accident, and a plaintiff-victim blood
relationship, was as illogical as denying recovery to a plaintiff
witness who observed the accident from outside the zone of
danger.' 0 2 Further, the Leong court viewed the Dillon requirement
of physical manifestations as wholly irrelevant to the issue of
liability for mental injuries arising from negligent conduct. 03
Expanding the Dillon doctrine considerably by granting
recovery to a plaintiff witness irrespective of the foreseeability of the
plaintiff's mental injuries, the Leong court reasoned that bystander
recovery for mental anguish would be governed by the traditional
tort principle of proximate cause. 04 The Leong court held that when
it is reasonable that an ordinary plaintiff witness would suffer
mental anguish by witnessing injury to another, the defendant's
conduct is, as a matter of law, the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. 105 Once proximate cause is estabished, extraneous matters
(such as the existence of a plaintiff-victim blood relationship, and
the proximity of the plaintiff witness to the accident) are indicative
N.W.2d 140 (1973) (mother witnessed child struck by truck); Corso v. Merrill, __ N.H. __, 406
A.2d 300 (1979) (parents witnessed motorist negligently collide with daughter); Portee v. Jaffee, 84
N..J. 88. 417 A.2d 521 (1980) (mother witnessed son suffer and die while he was trapped in an
elevator): Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146. 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (sister and mother observed child being
struck by automobile); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975) (mother
witnessed child being struck by mail truck); Dave Snelling Lincoln Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d
923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (mother witnessed son's fall out offautomobile and subsequent death).
99. 55 Hawaii 398. 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
100. Leong v. Takasaki. 55 Hawaii 398, 399, 520 P.2d 758. 760 (1974).
101. Rodrigues v. State. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). In an action for the negligent
infliction of mental distress caused by property damage to the plaintiff's home, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii held broadly that there is a duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of mental distress.
The court reasoned that the boundaries of the defendant's dutv are confined to foreseeable mental
distress created by the risk of engaging in unreasonable conduct. The court stated that compensable
mental distress may be found to exist in situations in which "a reasonable man, normally
constituted, woold be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the
circumstances offthe case. Id. at 173. 472 P.2d at 520.
102. Leong v. Takasaki. 55 Hawaii at 409-10, 520 P.2d at 766.
103. Id. at 403, 520 P.2d at 766-67.
104. Id. at 410, 520 P.2d at 765.
105. Id. For an argument that the Leong "proximate cause" test differs from the Dillon
"foreseeability" test in form but not in substance, see 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 212 (1979).
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only of the degree of mental distress suffered. 106
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, dissuaded by the artificiality
of the Dillon foreseeability test, made a noble attempt to maintain a
uniform standard of analysis for all negligence actions. The Leong
proximate cause standard, however, fell victim to a zone of danger
type restriction in the subsequent Hawaii case of Kelley v. Kokua
Sales and Supplies, Ltd. 107 Admitting that the Leong proximate cause
standard would not realistically limit liability in all situations, the
court in Kelley held that plaintiffs situated an unreasonable distance
from the accident would be excluded from the defendant's duty of
due care. 108
The court in Kelley determined that a proximate cause test, if
applied to situations in which the plaintiff was located an
unreasonable distance from the accident, would subject a
defendant to "unmanageable, unbearable, and totally
unpredictable liability.' ' 0 9 Therefore, based on considerations of
policy, the Supreme Court of Hawaii felt compelled to limit
recovery for the negligent infliction of mental distress to bystanders
who were located a reasonable distance from the accident."10
Although by requiring a reasonable distance the court employed an
artificial standard to deny recovery in Kelley,"' the doctrine of
proximate cause in Hawaii remains for the most part intact.
Like the Supreme Court of Hawaii, other courts have accepted
the Dillon policy of increased accountability for negligent acts, but
have fashioned different rules to govern the defendant's scope of
liability. In D'Ambra v. United States, 112 the plaintiff observed a
United States Postal Service truck strike and kill her four year old
son. Because the plaintiff witness was outside the zone of danger, 1
3
the federal district court was faced with an issue of first impression:
whether Rhode Island law allowed recovery for mental injury when
106. 55 Hawaii at 520, P.2d at 65-66.
107. 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975). In Kelley a father in California received news that his
daughter and grandchild had died in a car accident caused by the negligent defendant. The shock
from this news allegedly caused his fatal heart attack. The father's estate brought an action against
the negligent driver for the father's mental suffering. Id. at 206, 532 P.2d at 674-75.
108. Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supplies, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 209, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975).
109. Id. at 209,532 P.2d at 676.
110. Id. The court in Kelley stated that "the duty of care enunciated in Rodrigues and Leon£',
applies to plaintiffs meeting the standards stated in said cases, and who were located within a
reasonable distance from the scene of the accident." Id.
11l. Id. The court in Kelley has constructed an artificial limitation on the scope of a defendant's
duty similar to the limitations placed on duty by the zone of danger test. The zone of danger test,
however, denies recovery as a matter of law to the plaintiffwho was not in danger of physical impact.
See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S. 2d at 555. In
contrast, the implications of Kelley suggest that the trier of fact may determine by a preponderance of
the evidence whether the plaintiff was located within a reasonable distance from the scene of the
accident. See 56 Hawaii at 209, 532 P.2d at 676.
112. 351 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973).
113. D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 813 (D.R.I. 1973).
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the plaintiff did not fear for her own safety.
The D 'Ambra court reviewed the policy of Tobin and Dillon and
concluded that Rhode Island would accept the latter as its rule for
determining the defendant's scope of liability. 114  The court
concluded, however, that the Dillon three-prong test does not
sufficiently limit liability. I15 The court, therefore, deviated from the
Dillon theory by requiring one additional element in order to
establish foreseeability. The D'Ambra court reasoned that the
plaintiff's presence, in addition to his or her mental injury, must be
foreseeable. 11 6 In the court's view, the sine qua non of foreseeability
of presence must be determined by the specific facts of each case. 11 7
The D'Ambra court did, however, offer guidelines to help trial
courts determine the issue in future litigation by listing the
following factors as relevant to the issue of presence foreseeability:
"(1) The age of the child; (2) the type of neighborhood in which the
accident occurred; (3) the familiarity of the tortfeasor with the
neighborhood; (4) the time of day; and (5) all other circumstances
which would have put the tortfeasor on notice of the likely presence
of a parent. " 1 8
The D'Ambra court applied these criteria to the facts presented
and disposed of the foreseeability issue with little difficulty. The
defendant's employee was driving in a residential area where
playful youngsters typically are watched by concerned mothers.
Furthermore, the D'Ambra court noted that the defendant was
familiar with the neighborhood by virtue of previous mail deliveries
to the area. In the court's view, such facts decreed that the mother's
presence would have been expected. 1 9
114. Id. at 819.
115. Id. The Dillon three-prong test, which determines whether a plaintiff's mental distress is
foreseeable, mandates that the plaintiff and victim be closely related, the plaintiff be physically near
the accident, and the plaintiff witness the actual happening of the accident. 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441
P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
116. 354 F. Supp. at 819.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 820.
119. Id. at 822. It is submitted that a bystander analysis under the Dillon or D 'Ambra theory will
usually produce the same result. In the typical case in which a mother observes her child being struck
by a negligently driven automobile, both the mother's presence and her mental injuries will be
reasonably foreseeable. Facts may arise, however, in which the D'Ambra addition of "presence
foreseeability" will change the outcome of the litigation.
In Buckner v. Freightliner Corp., 403 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Okla. 1975), the plaintiffwas driving
a truck when his wife, who was a passenger, fell out the door and subsequently died from injuries
sustained from impact with the pavement. The plaintiff filed suit against the manufacturer and seller
of the truck, alleging traumatic neurosis from observing his wife's accident and death. The Dillon
criteria were arguably met in Buckner: a close relationship existed between the plaintiff and victim;
the plaintiff was physically proximate to his wife's peril; and he witnessed the accident
contemporaneously with its occurrence. The Buckner court reasoned, however, that as to the
defendant manufacturer and seller, the presence of the plaintiff at the time of the accident was an
unforeseen contingency. Therefore, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for damages from
traumatic neurosis. Id. at 675.
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Pennsylvania recently has applied the Dillon doctrine with
noteworthy modifications. The case of Sinn v. Bura'20 presented to
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania facts similar to those found in
Dillon. 121 In a plurality decision the Sinn court held that a cause of
action exists for mental anguish when a mother, although outside
the zone of danger, witnesses a sudden event that results in death to
her child. 122
The Sinn court maintained that modern complexities of society
demand that an increased level of responsibility be attributed to
wrongful acts. In the court's view, therefore, the Tobin zone of
danger rule was based on policy wholly inconsistent with the
realities of our intricate society. 123 The Sinn court held that
traditional foreseeability, 124 limited by the Dillon three-prong test,
would adequately limit liability on general bystander recovery for
the negligent infliction of mental distress. 2 5 The Sinn court,
however, determined that even the Dillon test 126 was unduly
restrictive for cases in which a mother witnessed injury to her child.
Abandoning the Dillon requirements of a close physical distance
between the injured child and the witnessing mother and the
mother's contemporaneous observance of the accident, the court
held that the mother's mental distress in such situations is a
foreseeable injury as a matter of law. 127 The Sinn court further
departed from Dillon by concluding that physical manifestations are
not necessary to prove the existence of emotional injury. 118
The fear expressed by the Court of Appeals of New York in
Tobin that "foreseeability, once recognized, is not so easily
limited,' 1 29 became more credible after the Massachusetts case of
Dziokonski v. Babineau. 130 The facts in Dziokonski are at the very least
It should be noted, however, that the Buckner court did not distinguish the Dillon test (which
requires only that the plaintiffs mental distress be foreseeable) from the D'Ambra test (which requires
that both the plaintiff's mental distress and presence be foreseeable). It is submitted, however, that
by disposing of the plaintiff's claim because his presence at the time of the accident was unforeseeable
for the defendant, the Buckner court has impliedly adopted the reasoning ofD 'Ambra.
120. 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). See also 25 VILL. L. REv. 195 (1979).
121. Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, -, 404 A.2d 672, 674 (1979). In Sinn, as in Dillon, the
plaintiff was in close proximity to the accident scene. The plaintiff mother stood next to the front
door of her home and witnessed an automobile strike her daughter. Id.
122. Id. at __, 404 A.2d at 686.
123. Id. at __, 404 A.2d at 681. The Sinn court stated that "[tihe more complex and
interwoven societal relations become the greater the responsibility one must accept for his or her
conduct." Id.
124. Id. at __, 404 A.2d at 684.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
127. 486 Pa. at __, 404 A.2d at 686.
128. Id. at -, 404 A.2d at 679 (advancements of medical science facilitate proving psychic
injury absent physical manifestations). The Supreme Court of California recently has abolished the
Dillon requirement of physical manifestations of the emotional injury. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
129. 24 N.Y.2d at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
130. - Mass. -,380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978).
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shocking. Norma Dziokonski, a minor, alighted from a school bus
and was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant. Mrs.
Dziokonski arrived at the scene after the accident. While riding as a
passenger in the ambulance carrying Norma, Mrs. Dziokonski
died from shock as a result of witnessing her daughter's injuries.
Mr. Dziokonski, after learning of his daughter's injuries and the
death of his wife, suffered a coronary occlusion and died shortly
thereafter. 1 31 Suit was filed by the administratrix of the estates for
the conscious pain and suffering experienced by the decendents.
Viewing the zone of danger test as an inadequate measure of
foreseeability of mental injury to a bystander, the Dziokonski court
adopted the Dillon approach to duty.132 The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, however, expanded the Dillon test, which requires a
contemporaneous observation of the distress-causing accident for
the plaintiff's mental distress to be foreseeable. 133 Reasoning that
"the shock of seeing a child severely injured immediately after the
tortious event may be just as profound as that experienced in
witnessing the accident itself,"134 the Dziokonski court held that a
parent who sustains psychic injury over peril to his or her child is
entitled to a claim for relief whether the parent witnesses the
accident or arrives on the scene while the injured child is still
present. 135 Although neither of the Dziokonski plaintiffs viewed or
heard of Norma's accident until after its occurrence, they were, by
virtue of the court's expansion of the Dillon contemporaneous
observance requirement, entitled to a claim for relief. 36
New Jersey abandoned the Tobin zone of danger doctrine in
the case of Portee v. Jaffee. 13 Adopting the rationale of Dillon, 138 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a parent outside the
physical zone of danger may recover damages for mental anguish
suffered by witnessing the negligent death of her child. 139 The Portee
court, however, modified the Dillon theory in three respects. First,
the Portee court held that recovery for emotional anguish would be
131. Dziokonski v. Babineau, __ Mass.... 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1296(1978),
132. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 1302. See also 13 SUFFOLK L. REv. 212 (1979).
133. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
134. -_Mass. at . , 380 N.E.2d at 1300 (quoting Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App.
2d 253, 256 79 Cal. Rptr. 23, 25 (1969) (emphasis added)).
135. Id. at -, 380 N. E.2d at 1302. The Dziokonski court concluded that by granting recovery
to a plaintiff who arrived at the scene soon after the accident occurred, the decision was compatible
with Dillon. Id. Less than one year later, however, in Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d
506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1968), the California appellate court held that for a plaintiff to state a claim
for relief under Dillon, she must contemporaneously observe the actual happening of the accident. Id.
at , 146 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
136. - Mass. at - 380 N.E.2d at 1303.
137.84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 520 (1980).
138. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
139. Portee v.Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, -, 417 A.2d 521,528 (1980).
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granted only if the victim died or suffered serious injury as a result
of the defendant's negligence. 140 The Dillon theory did not consider
the severity of injury to the victim. 14 1 Second, the Portee court
required a marital or intimate familial relationship between the
plaintiff and victim. The court thus defined the Dillon requisite of
"close relationship," reasoning that the intimacy of parental
sentiment would provide a logical boundary to the defendant's
liability. 142 Third, the Portee court required that the plaintiff's
emotional distress be severe, as opposed to the Dillon test, which
required only that the mental injury be manifested by physical
symptoms. 143
V. CALIFORNIA LIMITS DILLON
When California liberalized the bystander recovery rule in
Dillon v. Legg, 144 proponents of the Tobin zone of danger test viewed
the resulting three-prong test as incapable of limiting liability to a
reasonable degree. Post Dillon litigation has given the California
courts an opportunity to squarely face such charges. Recent cases
involving bystander claims for the negligent infliction of mental
distress have required the California courts to determine the limits
of the second Dillon criteria: "[w]hether the shock resulted from a
direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident .... ,,141 Unlike the
situation in Dillon, in which the plaintiff mother witnessed her
child's peril through the sense of sight, 146 recent California
litigation has extended foreseeable mental distress to situations in
which the plaintiff contemporaneously observed the accident
through other modes of sensory perception. 147
In Archibald v. Braverman4 8 a mother who did not witness the
explosion that caused injuries to her son, arrived on the scene
shortly thereafter. 149  Addressing the issue of her
140. Id. at -, 417 A.2d at 527.
141. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (court speaks only in terms of "accident"
and not "severity of accident").
142.84 N.J. at - , 417 A.2d at 526.
143. Id. at __, 417 A.2d at 522. See supra note 54 (California abandons requirements of
physical manifestations in order to state a claim for the negligent infliction of mental distress).
144. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72.
145. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. See supra text accompanying note 62 for the
three-prong Dillon foreseeability test.
146. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
147. See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977)
(although plaintiff did not see car strike wife, he knew her position an instant before and, therefore,
contern porancously perceived that she had been struck): Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App.
3d 553. 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978) (plaintiff mother heard cries of son and, therefore,
contemporaneously perceived his accident).
148. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
149. Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 723-24 (1969).
"contemporaneous observance" of the accident, the California
Appellate Court for the Fourth District reasoned that a mother who
witnesses her child's injuries moments after the accident may be
just as distressed as if she had actually observed the tortious event.
The Archibald court relaxed the requirement of contemporaneous
observation and held that a mother's mental injury is foreseeable
under Dillon when it results from witnessing her son's injuriesfairly
contemporaneously with the occurrence of the accident. 150
The Archibald precedent was employed by the plaintiff in
another case before the California Court of Appeals. In Deboe v.
Horn 51 the wife of an injured motorist was apprised of his paralysis
by third parties. Before sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the
insufficiency of the plaintiff's pleadings, the Deboe court sharply
distinguished the facts at bar from those in Dillon and Archibald. 152
In the court's view, Dillon and Archibald required the plaintiff's
personal observance of the accident scene. 153 Because Mrs. Deboe
had been merely advised of the accident by others, the Deboe court
concluded that her mental anguish was unforeseeable as a matter of
substantive law. 154
The Archibald "fairly contemporaneous observance" test was
refined in Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center. 155 Injansen the
plaintiff mother alleged mental distress resulting from observance
of her daughter's slow death, which purportedly was caused by the
defendant's diagnostic failures. 156 The California Court of Appeals
first stated that in order for the plaintiff's mental distress to be
foreseeable under Dillon, the plaintiff must have perceived the
accident through one of her five senses. 157 Further, the court
reasoned that Dillon required a contemporaneous observation of the
event, i.e., the plaintiff must perceive the actual happening of the
accident as opposed to its aftermath. 158
The Jansen court distinguished Archibald from the present
litigation by stating that although Mrs. Archibald did not visually
observe her child's accident, it could be inferred that she heard the
explosion and therefore experienced a contemporaneous sensory
150. Id. at 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725. The Archibald court stated that "[mIanifestly, the shock of
seeing a child severely injured immediately after the tortious event may be just as profound as that
experienced in witnessing the accident itself." Id.
151. 16 Cal. App. 3d221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971).
152. Deboe v. Horn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, __, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79 (1971).
153. Id.
154. Id. at __, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
155.31 Cal. App. 3d22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973).
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observation of the event.' 5 9 The Jansen court determined that the
facts at bar warranted an opposite result. In the court's view,
failure to diagnose was an omission wholly beyond a lay person's
perception; such an event could be perceived only by one trained in
the medical field. The Jansen court held that because the plaintiff
could not have perceived the event that caused her child's death,
i.e., negligent diagnosis, she failed to satisfy the Dillon requisite of
sensory and contemporaneous observance. Therefore, her mental
anguish was unforeseeable to the defendant. 160
Krouse v. Graham161 gave further credibility to the Jansen dictum
that a "sensory and contemporaneous observance" is not limited to
a visual perception of the accident. 162 The plaintiff in Krouse did not
see the defendant's automobile strike his wife. He did, however,
know that his wife was taking groceries out of the car when he
observed a vehicle speeding toward the parked car. The Supreme
Court of California declared that whether the plaintiff saw the
accident was immaterial; he knew his wife's position before the
accident and, thus, fully perceived the fact that she must have been
hit. The plaintiff was, therefore, deemed a "percipient witness,"
notwithstanding his lack of visual perception of the accident. 163 The
Krouse court held that the plaintiff experienced a sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the event causing injury to his wife
and, therefore, his mental injuries were foreseeable under the Dillon
analysis. 164
In Justus v. Atchinson 165 the Supreme Court of California
further refined the criteria for qualifying as a "percipient witness"
under Dillon. The Justus court refused to extend Dillon into the
159. Id. at 24-25, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
160. Id. Accord, Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 720 (1976). In Mobaldi the plaintiff's foster child was to receive a routine injection of a five
percent glucose solution. Instead of administering the prescribed dosage, the physician inadvertantly
injected the youth with a 50% mixture of glucose. While in his foster mother's arms, the child
became comatose and thereafter suffered permanent brain damage and quadraplegia. In granting
the plaintiff mother's claim for the negligent infliction of mental distress, the California appellate
court held that Dillon, although requiring the plaintiff's contemporaneous observance of the accident,
does not mandate that the plaintiff understand that the act observed, i.e., the negligent injection of
glucose, is responsible for the injury sustained. Id. at __, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
Injansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 884
(1973), the court held that to state a cause of action under Dillon, the plaintiff must perceive the
negligent act. Id. In Mobaldi, the court reasoned that the plaintiff need not understand that the
defendant's act caused the injury sustained. 55 Cal. App. 2d at __, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 727. Thus,
taken together, Jansen and Mobaldi require that the plaintiff recognize the defendant's negligent act,
but need not comprehend the ramifications of that act to state a cause of action under Dillon.
161. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
162. Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59. 76, 562 P.2d 1022. 1031, 1367 Cal. Rptr. 863, 872
(1977).
163. Id. The Krouse court stated that the plaintiff'knew his wife's "position an instant before the
impact, observed defendant's vehicle approach her at a high speed on a collision course, and realized
that defendant's car must have struck her." Id.
164. Id.
165. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97.
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operating room, where a distressed father learned that his child
died during birth. 166 In accordance with Krouse v. Graham,167 the
Justus court concluded that some type of sensory perception of the
negligent act is indispensible. Although the plaintiff injustus was in
the operating room during delivery, the facts indicated that he did
not see, hear, or in any way perceive the delivery.1 68 Unlike the
situation in Krouse, the ,Justus court reasoned that the plaintiff
perceived his child's death when he was told of the incident after its
occurrence. 169 Because the plaintiff's sensory observation of his
child's death was not contemporaneous with the negligent delivery,
his mental distress was unforeseeable under Dillon. 170
The Justus court also reasoned that the intent of Dillon was to
limit the sensory and contemporaneous observance test to
situations in which the plaintiff unwillingly observed a tort
committed upon a close relative. Therefore, the court sounded a
warning to future fathers who wish to participate during delivery:
Dillon requires an involuntary observation of the tort and one who
enters the operating room voluntarily must be equipped to deal
with the possibility of an unpleasant experience. 17'-
In Nazaroff v. Superior Court 72 the plaintiff mother's claim for
the negligent infliction of mental distress was deemed actionable
even though she arrived at the scene after her three year old son fell
into the neighbor's pool.173 Prior to her arrival at the pool area, the
plaintiff mother had made a futile search of the neighborhood for
her son. Upon hearing the cry, "It's Danny," she rushed to a
neighbor's swimming pool, only to find Danny submerged in the
water. 174
The California Appellate Court refused to conclude that Mrs.
Nazaroff did not experience a sensory and contemporaneous
observance of her son's accident. In the court's view, it was
probable that when the mother heard the cry of rescuers, her first
sensory perception was that Danny was hurt. 75 Further, because
166.Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d. 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97(1977).
167. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863.
168..Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d at 584, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
169. Id. at __, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
170. Id. Dillon also required more than just the plaintiff's physical presence at the scene of the
accident. The plaintiff in some way must contemporaneously perceive the occurrence of the accident.
Id.
171. Id. at __, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The court cautioned that the doctrine
of assumption of risk was not being invoked upon plaintiffs in the operating room, "but the
everpresent possibility of emotional distress dissuades us from extending the Dillon rule into the
operating amphitheater in these circumstances." Id.
172.80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978).
173. Nazaroffv. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, -, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657, 664 (1978).
174. Id. at __, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
175. Id.
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the shout came from the pool area, the Nazaroff court concluded
that the plaintiff might have specifically sensed the circumstances of
her son's peril. 17 6 In light of the inferences supporting the claim
that the plaintiff contemporaneously perceived the accident,
thereby making her mental injuries foreseeable under Dillon, the
Nazaroff court concluded that the trier of fact should resolve the
"sensory and contemporaneous observance" issue. 117
In Parsons v. Superior Court'78 the members of plaintiff's family
departed from a social gathering in separate cars. Upon turning a
curve, the plaintiffs viewed the wreckage of the car containing their
close family members and immediately realized that the occupants
were either dead or seriously injured. Although the plaintiffs
arrived at the scene "before the dust had settled," 179 the California
Court of Appeals experienced little difficulty in denying their
claims for the negligent infliction of mental distress against the
defendant driver on the basis that their mental anguish was
unforeseeable under Dillon. 180 Because the plaintiffs arrived after
the accident occurred, they were barred from asserting a
contemporaneous observation of the accident through the sense of
sight. The Parsons court further reasoned that nothing in the record
indicated a contemporaneous observation of the accident via the
sense of hearing or any other mode of perception. '8'
By the process of accretion, the California courts have refined
the "sensory and contemporaneous observance" guideline of the
Dillon test. A bystander plaintiff must be certain that he observed
the victim's peril through sensory perception'82 at the time of the
176. Id.
177. Id. at__, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664-65.
178. 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).
179. Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 509, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495, 496 (1978).
180. Id. at 512, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977)
(father did not see, hear, or in any way perceive the negligent delivery of his child; his mental distress
was therefore deemed unforeseeable under Dillon).
In Burke v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the
surviving twin sister of a passenger killed on the defendant's airplane alleged mental anguish
contemporaneous with the accident through extrasensory empathy. Notwithstanding the fact that
the plaintiff was home in California while her sister was traveling over the Canary Islands, the
plaintiff claimed that she knew her sister had died. Id. at 851.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, applying California
law, determined that the plaintiff's knowledge of her sister's death was not enough to sustain a cause
of action under Dillon. Id. at 851-52.
In addition to the requirement of knowledge, the Burke court held that the plaintiff must perceive
the actual event which caused the victim's trauma. Id. at 852. Because the plaintiff knew only that
her sister had died and did not perceive the specific circumstances causing death, she did not
experience a sensory and contemporaneous observance of her sister's peril. Id. Therefore, the
plaintiff's mental distress was unforeseeable under Dillon. Id. Moreover, the Burke court reasoned
that imposing liability on the basis of extrasensory perception would render a defendant liable for
unforeseeable consequences which Dillon attempts to proscribe. Id.
accident; 18 otherwise, his pleading will be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. By specifically
limiting actionable claims for mental injury to situations in which
the plaintiff experienced a sensory and contemporaneous
observance of the accident, 184 California has limited the breadth of
the Dillon foreseeability test. Therefore, there is no longer need to
fear potentially unlimited liability under Dillon.
VI. REMOVING THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE POSITION
OF A BYSTANDER
A plaintiff who witnesses injury to another is often not a
typical bystander. In limited situations, particularily those
involving a consensual and contractual relationship, the plaintiff's
expectation that the defendant will perform competently provides a
more compelling circumstance in which to recognize the plaintiff's
claim for the negligent infliction of mental distress. The Tobin zone
of danger test, mandating that the bystander be subject to potential
physical impact as a result of the defendant's negligence, 8 5 will
deny recovery for mental distress in situations in which a plaintiff
mother witnesses birth defects suffered by her newborn infant or
the mishandling of the child by medical personnel after delivery. 18 6
Under these circumstances, a bystander theory of recovery, which
requires that the mother fear for potential physical impact upon her
person as a prerequisite to recovery for her mental distress, strains
legal reasoning because, as to the mother, a zone of physical danger
will not exist. In such a situation, the defendant, whose negligent
act causes physical harm to the child, is neither guiding an
instrumentality nor performing any act which places the plaintiff
mother in danger of physical impact upon her person. 181 In order to
avoid inequitable results in cases in which a bystander theory of
recovery does not logically apply to the facts presented, courts have
183. See, e.g., Hair v. County of Monterey,- 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975)
(parents did not see injured child until after the accident; recovery denied); Powers v. Sissoev, 39
Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974) (mother observed her injured child 30 to 60 minutes
after the accident; recovery denied).
184. See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977)
(plaintiff knew wife's position immediately before the accident and therefore fully perceived the tact
that she must have been hit).
185.24 N.Y.2d 609, 611,249 N.E.2d 419, 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 555 (1969).
186. See, e. ., Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972) (newborn infant
dropped onto tiled floor in mother's presence); Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 71 A.D.2d 270, 422
N.Y.S. 2d 679 (1979) (negligent manufacture and prescription of drugs ingested by mother during
pregnancy produced birth defects on newborn infant).
187. In situations like Whetham, 197 N.W.2d 678, in which a hospital employee drops the
patient's newborn baby, it is submitted that the only way the mother would be within a zone of
physical danger is if she were subjected to potential physical impact from the falling infant.
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compensated the plaintiff for mental anguish by recognizing an
independent duty flowing from the defendant to the plaintiff. 188
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,
departed from the strict Tobin zone of danger analysis in the case of
Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp. 189 In Vaccaro parents of a deformed child filed
suit against a drug manufacturer and the mother's physician,
alleging that their child's deformities resulted from the negligent
manufacture and careless prescription of a progestational hormone
taken by the mother during pregnancy. The plaintiffs further
alleged that such negligence was the proximate cause of their
extreme mental anguish. 90 The Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, held that the mother stated a cause of action
against both defendants for the negligent infliction of mental
distress but that the father's allegations would necessarily fail upon
defendant's motion to dismiss. '91
The Vaccaro court reasoned that unlike the situation in Tobin,
in which the plaintiff witnessed her child being struck by an
automobile,192 the present defendant committed affirmative acts
toward the mother. The acts of manufacturing and prescribing the
drugs were thus the basis for establishing a duty flowing from the
defendants to the mother. 93 The court further reasoned that the
rationale of Tobin - the danger of granting recovery to those
indirectly involved in the tort - was not dispositive of the present
case. The court stated the following:
The imagined difficulty of circumscribing either damages
or liability is overcome if the wife's causes of action are
sustained because the duty was owed to her, the drug
was administered to her, and she carried and gave birth to
the child. There is a vital interest to be protected, there is
proximate cause, there is demonstrable injury, and there
is foreseeability. 194
By finding a duty owed directly to the mother, the Vaccaro
188. See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (failure to inform parents of the risk
that their child may be inflicted with Down's syndrome was a breach of direct duty owed to parents);
Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 71 A.D.2d 270, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1979) (negligent manufacture and
prescription of drugs breached a direct duty owed to mother).
189. 71 A.D.2d 270, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1979).
190. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 71 A.D.2d 270, -, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (1979).
191. Id. at __ 422 N.Y.S.2d at 684. The court stated that although the lather surely suffered
mental injury, he did not ingest the drug and, therefore, was not a recipient of any duty owed by the
defendant. His action was limited to a claim for loss of consortium. Id.
192.24 N.Y.2d at , 249 N.E.2d at 420, 301 N.Y.S. 2d at 556.
193. 71 A.D.2d at., 422 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
194. Id. at -, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 683-84.
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court was not confined to a zone of danger analysis. Irrespective of
the affirmative acts committed by the defendants, i.e., the
manufacture and injection of drugs, it is submitted that the
situations in Vaccaro and Tobin are not so dissimilar. Both cases
involved a claim for the negligent infliction of mental distress
occasioned by witnessing injury to another. Therefore, although
the Vaccaro court distinguished Tobin, the decision indicates the
New York court's willingness to recognize an independent basis of
duty in compelling situations.
Berman v. Allan'95 presented the Supreme Court of New Jersey
with facts similar to those put before the New York court in
Vaccaro. 196 In Berman the plaintiffs brought suit against their
physician for the alleged "wrongful birth" of their child,
maintaining that the defendant's failure to provide information on
the risks of Down's syndrome prevented the plaintiff mother from
exercising her constitutional right to an abortion. 197 The plaintiff
parents further alleged that the physician's negligence was the
proximate cause of their resulting mental distress. 198
In Vaccaro the New York court's finding of a direct duty owed
to the mother rested upon the affirmative act of manufacturing and
injecting medication.199 The Berman court, however, in finding the
defendant liable for the negligent infliction of mental distress,
reasoned that the physician's omission was a deviation from
acceptable medical standards and therefore a breach of a direct
duty owed to the parents.200 Additionally, the Vaccaro court found a
breach of duty owed to the child. 20 1 In contrast, the Berman court
refused to recognize the infant's claim for "wrongful birth" and, as
a result, concluded that no tort had been committed upon the
child.202
By finding a direct duty owed to the plaintiffs in a limited case
of medical malpractice, the Berman court manifestly removed the
claimants from the position of Mrs. Palsgraf.20 3 Berman thus stands
for the recognition of a duty flowing from an obstetrician to the
195.80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
196. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 71 A.D.2d at __, 422 N.Y.S. 2d at 680.
197. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,425,404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979).
198. Id.
199. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 71 A.D.2d at-_, 422N.Y.S.2d at 682.
200.80 N.J. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10.
201.71 A.D.2d at -. , 422 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
202. 80 N.J. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13. See also Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in New
Jersey: Compensating the Foreseeable Plaintiff, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 796, 816 (1980).
203. It is of interest to note that since the Berman decision, New lersey has repudiated the zone of
danger rule in favor of the Dillon foresecability test. See Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521
(1980). It is submitted that Berman nonetheless breaks new ground by finding a duty owed directly to
the parents by the physician, irrespective of a bystander analysis.
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expectant parents to refrain from the negligent infliction of mental
distress, irrespective of any injury inflicted upon the child. 20 4
In the California case of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals20 5
a staff physician erroneously advised the plaintiff's wife that she
had contracted an infectious type of syphilis. The plaintiff's wife
subsequently became suspicious of the plaintiff's loyalty and
thereafter initiated proceedings to dissolve the marriage. The
plaintiff husband filed suit against the defendant hospital, alleging
that the physician's negligent diagnosis caused him to suffer
extreme anguish.
206
The defendant hospital maintained that the plaintiff husband
was a third party to the tort committed upon his wife and,
therefore, the issue of liability for the negligent infliction of mental
distress should be governed by the Dillon foreseeability test. 20 7 The
defendant further asserted that because the plaintiff was not present
when the doctor made his negligent diagnosis, the plaintiff husband
did not contemporaneously perceive the event. Because the
plaintiff husband was not a percipient witness to the erroneous
diagnosis, the defendant hospital maintained that his resulting
mental distress was unforeseeable under Dillon.208
The Supreme Court of California, however, reasoned that the
plaintiff was not a bystander to the tort committed upon his wife,
but rather the victim of a breached duty owed directly to him.
20 9
In the Molien court's view, the intimacy of the marital relationship
made the risk of psychic harm to the plaintiff reasonably
foreseeable. Because the defendant knew or should have known
that an erroneous diagnosis of the wife's condition as infectious
syphilis would proximately cause the plaintiff's mental distress, the
Supreme Court of California held that, irrespective of the
bystander theory of recovery under Dillon, the defendant breached
an independent duty owed to the plaintiff husband. Therefore, the
defendant was held liable for the plaintiff's ensuing mental
anguish. 21 0
204. See Note, Negligent Infliction oJ Emotional Distress in New Jersey: Compensating the Foreseeable
Plaintiff, 32 RUrGERS L. REv. 796, 816 (1980).
205. 27 Cal. 3d916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
206. Molien %. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916. __ 616 P.2d 813, 814-15, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831, 832-33 (1980).
207. Id. at 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
208. Id. at__, 616 P.2d at 815-16, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34.
209. Id. at__, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
210. Id.
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VII. WHETHAM V. BISMARCK HOSPITAL: DOES THE
CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIP CREATE AN
INDEPENDENT DUTY?
In Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital 211 the Supreme Court of
North Dakota expressly stated that in North Dakota the Tobin zone
of danger test was to govern bystander recovery for the negligent
infliction of mental distress.112 Because the Whetham court rejected
public policy arguments underlying the Dillon foreseeability test,
any change in North Dakota bystander recovery law will most
likely be influenced by the Tobin policy of limited liability.
Therefore, in situations like Whetham, in which a hospital patient
observes a tort committed upon her newborn infant by a hospital
employee, 213 a plausible and more equitable theory of recovery
would discard the zone of danger test as inapplicable to the facts
presented, remove the claimant from the position of a bystander,
and invoke a direct duty from the hospital to the patient.
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals of New York in
Vaccaro,214 the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Berman, 11 5 and the
Supreme Court of California in Molien, 216 by distinguishing the
distressed claimant from the ordinary bystander, have provided
workable theories, which invoke a direct duty flowing from the
defendant to the plaintiff. In Vaccaro the New York Court of
Appeals reasoned that the To bin zone of danger test was not
dispositive of the litigation because the defendant physician
breached a duty owed directly to the expectant mother by
negligently prescribing medication. Accordingly, the defendant
was held accountable for the mother's mental anguish occasioned
by witnessing her child's birth defects.2 1 7 By virtue of the
relationship between the plaintiffs and the physician, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, in Berman, held the physician liable for the
plaintiffs' mental distress proximately caused by the physician's
failure to inform the expectant parents of the risk that their child
could be born with Down's syndrome. 21 8 In Molien, the Supreme
Court of California reasoned that the Dillon bystander recovery rule
did not apply when the plaintiff husband suffered mental trauma
211. 197 N.W.2d 678.
212. Id. at 684-85.
213. Id. at 679.
214. 71 A.D.2d 270, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679.
215. 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8.
216. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831.
217. 71 A.D.2d at - , 422 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
218. 80 NJ. at 424, 404 A. 2d at 10.
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caused by the defendant physician's negligent and erroneous
diagnosis of infectious syphilis in the plaintiff's wife. In the Molien
court's view the defendant physician breached an independent duty
owed to the plaintiff husband because the physician knew or should
have known that an erroneous diagnosis of syphilis would produce
marital disharmony and cause emotional distress to the patient's
spouse.219
Like the situations in Berman and Vaccaro, the defendant
hospital in Whetham knowingly entered into a consensual
relationship with the plaintiff mother. The hospital-patient
relationship was based on the theory that the patient could rely on
the hospital's skilled employees to use reasonable care in delivering
and attending to her child. By recognizing such a relationship, it is
submitted that the defendant hospital impliedly recognized a direct
duty flowing from its employees to the mother.220 It is further
submitted that like the situation in Molien,22 1 reason compels the
conclusion that the defendant hospital in Whetham knew or should
have known that dropping a newborn infant in the mother's
presence would cause the mother severe mental injury. In such a
situation, there is proximate cause and foreseeable injury.
Therefore, in limited situations of obstetrical malpractice, in which
a zone of physical danger is arguably not present, it is submitted
that the issue should not be whether a bystander may recover
damages for mental anguish by witnessing injury to another. 222
219. 27 Cal. 3d at -, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
220. See Note, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress in New Jersey: Compensating the Foreseeable
Plaintiff 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 796, 822, 824 (a consensual relationship and knowledge of plaintiff's
presence provide basis for independant duty).
221. 27 Cal. 2d 916, -, 616 P.2d 813, 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831,835.
222. New York decisions since Tobin have arguably expanded the zone of danger doctrine. In
Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975),
the plaintiff employee walked into her supervisor's office and discovered her supervisor lying in a
pool of blood flowing from a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. In an action for worker's
compensation, the intermediate appellate court reasoned that mental injury resulting from psychic
trauma was uncompensable as a matter of law. Id. at __ , 330 N.E.2d at 603-04, 369 N.Y.S.2d at
638-39. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the lower court, holding that under that law of
worker's compensation, psychological injury is compensable to the same extent as physical injury.
Id. at 510,330 N.E.2d at 606,369 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
The Wolfe court distinguished the Tobin zone of danger analysis from the facts presented on two
grounds. First, the court reasoned that tort liability was discernible from worker's compensation; the
former is based on fault while the latter simply shifts the risk of loss to those engaged in the industry.
Id. at __, 330 N.E.2d at 605, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 640. Second, the Wolfe court distinguished the
claimant from the ordinary bystander. The record indicated that the plaintiff became intensely
concerned with her supervisor's health, a concern manifested by assuming some of his regular
business duties. Id. at 511, 330 N.E.2d at 606-07, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 642. Because the facts revealed a
resolute relationship between the plaintiff and decedent, the Wolfe court reasoned that the plaintiff
was not merely a bystander witnessing injury to another but rather an "active participant" in the
decendent's peril. Id.
A recent New York Supreme Court decision, Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical Center Hosp., 103
Misc. 2d 98, 425 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1980), relying on the Wolfe dicta that a third party who
"actively participates" in the victim's trauma may be removed from the position of a bystander.
represents an unprecedented leap from the Tobin zone of danger doctrine. In Lafferty a mismatched
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Instead, the issue should be whether a patient may recover
damages for her hospital's negligence. 223
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the past fourteen years, the number of jurisdictions accepting
the Dillon bystander recovery rule steadily has increased. 224 By
refining the sensory and contemporaneous observation test, the
Supreme Court of California may further promote the acceptance
of Dillon elsewhere. However, it would be unfounded speculation to
assume that the Dillon doctrine will supersede the zone of danger
test in North Dakota and the majority of jurisdictions that have
blood transfusion of the decendent was witnessed by the decendent's daughter-in-law. The plaintiff
brought suit against the hospital for her emotional injuries. Id. Because the plaintiff went to the aid of
her mother-in-law after the negligent transfusion, she maintained that the theory of "danger invites
rescue" applied to the case at bar. The Supreme Court of New York. however, chose to rely on Wolfe
and declared that the plaintiff was not a bystander to the incident but rather an "active participant"
therein. Id. at - 425 N.Y.S.2d at 245-46.
The Lafferty court noted that the plaintiff's presence was actually known to the hospital
employees. Adopting the rationale of' Dillon, the court stated: "If the injured party's presence is
actually known, it follows that the only reasonable circumscription of the extent of the duty owed by
the tortfeasor is that of a reasonably foreseeable zone of danger within which psychic trauma may be
inflicted." Id. at __, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Lafferty court recognized that California cases since Dillon have largely suppressed
the Tobin fear of unlimited liability. Reasoning that the Court of Appeals of New York may be ready
to allow recovery under such facts, the Lafferty court held that when the plaintiff is directly involved in
the victim's traumatic experience, when her presence is actually known, and when her mental
anguish is reasonably foreseeable, liability may be found to exist. Id. at __, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, reversed the lower court's decision in
Lafferty on the theory that the position of the plaintiff in Lafferty was more like that of an ordinary
bystander situated outside the physical zone of danger. Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical Center
Hosp-, __ A.D.2d ., -, 435 N.Y.S.2d 307, 311-12 (1981), rev'g, - Misc. 2d __ , 425
N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1980). The appellate court in Lafferty disagreed with the trial court on the
issue of whether the plaintiff was an "active participant" in the decedent's peril. Noting that the
Court of Appeals of New York previously had granted relief to a plaintiff who "was an 'active
participant' and not a 'third party merely witnessing injury to another' ", the appellate court in
Lafferty determined that the facts at bar did not establish "active participation." Id. at __ , 435
N.Y.S.2d at 310 (quoting Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 511, 330 N.E.2d
603, 606-07, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 642) The court reasoned that, unlike the situation in Wolfe, 36
N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, the plaintiffin Lafferty did not "participate" in the
trauma until after the event that caused her mother-in-law's injury. - A.D.2d at __ , 435
N.Y.S.2d at 311. Therefore, because the plaintiff did not "actively participate" prior to the
negligent blood transfusion, the court deemed her an ordinary bystander outside the zone of danger
and denied her relief for the negligent infliction of' mental distress. Id. at __, 435 N.Y.2d at 312
(citing Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554).
The concept of "active participation" will be further defined if the Lafferty decision is appealed
itt the Court of Appeals of New York. The traditional notion of foreseeability, coupled with facts
showing defendant's actual knowledge of the plaintiff's presence, may persuade the court of appeals
that the concept of -active participation" presents a viable exception to the restrictive zone of danger
rule.
223. Cf Howard v. lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977). Parents
tf an infant born with Tay-Sachs disease brought an action against the physician, claiming that his
negligent diagnosis proximately caused their resulting mental distress. Adhering to the zone of
danger thctry. the Court of Appeals of New York viewed the parents as bystanders and denied
rt'tVt t'rv. Id.
In it disscniing opinitn. .ustiit' Cttoke noted that patients place great reliance and faith in the
acts o surgeons. Justice Ctokte ttltIcled. therefitre. that a duty ,,as owed directly to the patient:
'To infer that ititther is ,t bystander at the birth of her inflant manifests a basic misunderstanding
of the duty owed it patient by a physician." Id. at _. 336 N.E.2d at 68, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 368
(Cookc,. j. disst'nting).
224. See.tupra notit. 98 ftr.jurisdictions that hate acc'oted the Dillon foreseeability test.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
expressly adopted the Tobin policy of limited liability for the
negligent infliction of mental distress. The subsequent restraints
put on Dillon in recent California litigation have not dealt
sufficiently with all problems inherent in an analysis based on a
three-prong foreseeability test. Although the Dillon sensory and
contemporaneous observation requirement currently mandates
that the plaintiff perceive the happening of the accident in order for
her mental distress to be foreseeable, 22 5 there appears to be little
logic in distinguishing the plaintiff who arrives at the scene of the
accident "before the dust has settled" by proclaiming that her
mental anguish is unforeseeable. Furthermore, the Dillon requisite
of a close relationship between the plaintiff and victim is yet to be
adequately defined. Jurisdictions adopting Dillon may be inviting
litigation by drawing lines of liability that exclude some relatives
and by supporting such exclusions with strained legal principles.
Moreover, we live in a society in which the utility of automobiles is
very important, and it is doubtful that practical politics will tolerate
the extensive economic burdens Dillon's rule could place on the
users of our highways.
It is submitted that the zone of danger test, although practical
in cases of automobile negligence, fails to provide a just and
reasonabie i suii  certain limited situations. When the tortfeasor
enters into a consensual relationship with the plaintiff, has
knowledge of the relationship between plaintiff and victim, has
knowledge of plaintiff's presence, and is aware that the plaintiff
relies on his or her expertise, the Tobin declaration that policy
demands a "dollar-and-cents ' 2 6 constraint on liability is without
merit. The zone of danger test fails in its essential purpose of
placing reasonable circumscriptions on liability. In such _arguably
compelling situations traditional tort principles of foreseeability
and proximate cause will more clearly attune the tortfeasor's
liability to his degree of culpability. When the defendant knowingly
places the plaintiff within the psychic "zone of risk," he or she has
actual knowledge that a departure from the recognized standard of
care may cause emotional injury to the plaintiff. Accordingly, he or
she should be responsible to the plaintiff to perform within the
bounds of prudence and due care.
THOMAS M. HNASKO
225. e. .. Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506. 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).
226. 24 N.Y.2d at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
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